Caitilyn Allen is a plant pathologist and professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. The WSWS recently interviewed her on the frame-up of two Chinese researchers at the University of Michigan charged by federal prosecutors with smuggling plant pathogens into the US and linked by the Trump administration to alleged agroterrorism.

Stephen St. Clair: Yunqing Jian is being held in federal custody, facing imprisonment for up to 20 years for “smuggling” a common plant pathogen. Last week I spoke to an Oakland University researcher who stated: “All the coverage was about Fusarium graminearum being a potential agroterrorism agent, and that’s completely absurd. You’ve got a pathogen that’s already present, it’s basically ubiquitous across lots of different countries... What kind of an idiot would try to use this as an agroterrorism agent?” Do you agree with this assessment?

Caitilyn Allen: I agree that Fusarium graminearum would not be an effective agroterrorism agent because this crop pathogen is already widely established across the US, including in the upper Midwest. It has been here for over 100 years. It causes diseases called head blight or scab on wheat and barley, but growers have good tools to manage these diseases. These tools include disease-resistant crop varieties developed by research in labs like the one where Drs. Jian and Han worked at the University of Michigan.

The US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the agency responsible for protecting our farmers from introduced pests and quarantine organisms, has a list of so-called Select Agent plant pathogens that are considered to pose a significant threat to US agriculture. Fusarium graminearum is not on the Select Agent list, indicating that USDA-APHIS doesn’t see it as a highest-concern pathogen. I would not expect it to be difficult to obtain an APHIS permit to import this fungus.

SSC: Chengxuan Han is also being held in federal custody, facing up to 20 years, but her case involves charges of sending roundworms (C. elegans) and plasmids on filter paper through the mail without proper permits. No pathogens or parasites, just C. elegans. How common is it for researchers, particularly early-career scientists, to transfer or receive such non-hazardous biological specimens across international borders without formal permits, and what are the primary reasons for this practice? Are the charges against Han proportional to her actions? What might have happened if Han had been from the UK, Japan, or Germany?

CA: Sharing plasmids on filter paper is a common practice among scientists. Plasmids are small circular pieces of bacterial DNA. They are not alive. A plasmid might carry a cloned gene for study, for example. Once a plasmid is put inside a bacterium, the bacterium can make more copies of the plasmid or just store it.

Plasmids are general tools, used widely to study genetics or do biotechnology. Scientists frequently exchange plasmids, it’s part of normal research collaboration, usually done by mail. To the best of my knowledge, a permit is not required to move DNA in general. An exception might be made for specific kinds of DNA that could be misused, like DNA that encodes a complete human virus or a toxin. I will add, however, that once a DNA sequence is known and published, you can order a copy of that DNA from many companies that will synthesize it.

The only reason to hand-carry a plasmid for research is to save some time and money. Although I don’t know if movement of C. elegans is regulated, I do know that these microscopic roundworms are harmless and very widely used as model organisms for studying development and for teaching biology.

SSC: What are the responsibilities of a principal investigator (PI) or senior supervisor when an early-career scientist in their lab engages in informal material transfer practices? Is there sufficient institutional guidance or training on these specific issues?

CA: The PI of a research lab is generally considered responsible for professional actions of lab group members. Institutions like universities have increasingly large offices to ensure compliance with research-related behavior. This typically involves required online trainings, courses, or workshops on topics like animal care, human subject experiments, interpersonal behavior in the science workplace, determining publication authorships, etc. Individual PIs typically train informally on an as-needed basis for ordinary scientific actions like material transfer of research materials and obtaining required permits (as should have been done for the Fusarium samples). That said, individual lab practices vary.

SSC: The World Socialist Web Site links these arrests to an escalating anti-China campaign and the continuation of the “China Initiative” from the first Trump administration, as part of preparations for war. Has this geopolitical tension had a chilling effect on scientific collaboration between US and Chinese institutions?

CA: I can’t comment on this beyond my direct interactions with scientists from China. Several people I have talked with are understandably anxious about their ability to continue doing research or graduate training in the US. More broadly, US science would be less productive and less innovative if the best and brightest from other countries no longer came to learn and work here. International exchanges and collaborations have undoubtedly fueled our country’s scientific pre-eminence. In particular, Chinese students and scientists have been valuable partners for generations. In my own field of agricultural research, China has become a real powerhouse in recent years.

SSC: What do you think about the way these cases have been reported in the corporate media?

CA: It is unfortunate when the media exaggerates the potential threat posed by a common crop pest like Fusarium graminearum. I understand the drive to write clickbait, but it’s irresponsible and unethical to say these scientists were planning to commit agroterrorism. Importantly, reporting from CNN and the Detroit News included extensive comments from expert plant pathologists explaining that this fungus was not a plausible agroterrorism weapon.

SSC: Our student group, the International Youth and Students for Social Equality (IYSSE), is the only organization at the University of Michigan that has spoken in defense of Jian and Han. What do you think of our call to defend Jian and Han?

CA: Personally, I’m glad that someone is speaking up for these researchers. They certainly should have obtained a permit to move the fungal strains, but importing without a permit has been punished with a fine, not a 20-year jail sentence. They must be terrified. I hope they have good lawyers.