This is the conclusion of a three-part interview with Dr. Peter Daszak, conducted as part of the Global Workers’ Inquest into the COVID-19 Pandemic. Part 1 can be read here and Part 2 here.

Benjamin Mateus (BM): Moving ahead to May 1, 2024, your testimony at the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic hearings, Chairman Brad Wenstrup accused you and EcoHealth Alliance of systemic disregard for oversight. Can you speak on that date and the impressions the hearing left with you? You were scapegoated, never allowed to respond to the questions posed to you. In our view, it was a shameful frame-up.

Peter Daszak (PD): It was a disgrace. This committee’s activities and many other aspects of the attacks we were put through taught me that our institutions are far weaker than we believed. Think back to the 2020 election: Trump falsely claimed victory and tried to overturn the results. I was shocked that a democracy like the US could rely on just a handful of individuals to uphold a free and fair election. The Electoral College system, and the idea that Vice President Mike Pence could have swung the outcome, revealed just how fragile our democratic safeguards are—and how little some leaders respect the will of the people.

This fragility extends to scientific research. The process of publishing, peer review and editorial independence can all be attacked and undermined. Political actors can pressure journals to retract papers, and editors often cave. This is accelerating under a second Trump administration.

It has deeply affected my work. We’ve had to fight for every paper since the pandemic and the backlash to ensure the research remains available. This began with Trump but was accelerated by the Republican-led congressional committees in 2022, determined to “investigate the Biden administration” and push baseless corruption claims. 

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic (SSCP) is a perfect example. It wasn’t about understanding the origins of the virus or evaluating science-based policies like masking. It was political from the start—and bipartisan, too. Watch my testimony: I was brought in under the pretense of answering questions but was frequently interrupted and harassed. At one point, Representative Morgan Griffith even cut me off and said, “I will give you the answer.” [See Video at 1:21:30]

Why bring me in at all? Because I was a political target. They had already embraced the lab leak theory and needed a scapegoat. They tried to pin the pandemic on EcoHealth Alliance and on me—an absurd and disturbing accusation. And no matter what I said, the outcome was predetermined. It was a circus. But I stand by the truth and by every word I said on that day.

Following the hearing, and the new allegations that were thrown at us on the day, we spent weeks compiling evidence to refute their claims and published a full rebuttal. They never addressed it—not publicly, at least. They had their conclusions before the hearings even began. But our response is out there, and it must stay out there. In time, history will judge. And it will judge that these hearings—and the committee behind them—were a McCarthyite, anti-science, anti-democratic, anti-China and anti-communist campaign.

BM: You’re referring to the September 2024 rebuttal EcoHealth submitted in response to the SCCP’s allegations. I found that report truly remarkable. It directly addressed every accusation made against your former organization, offering a clear, detailed examination of the correspondences, the timeline of events and the research itself.

It was not only informative—it was thorough and non-trivial. The report gave readers a rare look into the behind-the-scenes regulatory work of ongoing research, a process most people never get to see. More than that, it stood as a strong defense of science against the malicious and unfounded accusations leveled at you.

I think it’s important, especially in this interview, that you highlight some of the key points you weren’t allowed to express during the hearings. The sections on biosafety and gain-of-function research were particularly compelling and deserve more attention.

PD: What we saw with the evolution of the narrative from the conspiracy side was that they were looking for something to pin on EcoHealth and me to support their accusations that this was a Fauci-driven pandemic. As it stands now, they have essentially established the lab leak conspiracy as the official narrative. They are openly stating that Fauci funded the research that led to the pandemic.

Initially, we knew they couldn’t say it openly that EcoHealth did gain-of-function work, because we had a letter from NIH where they reviewed our research and determined it did not meet the definition of gain-of-function, as it was stated in the regulations at the time. 

Legally, whether or not a planned experiment would be gain-of-function is decided before you even begin the work, and the organization that decides that is NIH/HHS (National Institutes of Health/US Department of Health and Human Services), based on rules that are public that we all know and adhere to. We knew there was no way the press could ever say that we did gain-of-function research. What we used to see early on was, “They are accused of doing gain-of-function research,” or “There are questions over whether they did gain-of-function research.” 

Eventually they didn’t bother with all that. They just carried on saying Collins and Fauci are lying, and they did do gain-of-function research. They now say it repeatedly every single day, like a big lie, to the point that it’s believed just as everyone believed there were “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq after 911. But the facts are clear that we did not do gain-of-function research. And that report lays out clearly and succinctly why we didn’t.

Our research was reviewed in advance by the NIH. We all looked at the rules which state something is likely to lead to enhanced transmission or virulence of a pathogen that is already known to infect humans. None of that was true in our case. We were working with bat coronaviruses, which do not cause harm in humans. So, we didn’t do gain-of-function research; it’s that simple. 

Honestly, it’s quite outrageous and at the same time almost comical that I’m the person who somehow has been linked to this phrase “gain-of-function.” I don’t even do laboratory virology work. I know what gain-of-function is, and I know what it isn’t. And we know that because we were thoroughly reviewed ahead of time by NIH and they declared that our work wasn’t gain-of-function. These allegations are patently false. All those details are in that report.

On the issue of biosafety, again, that was something Senator Rand Paul made a big deal about. He used a phrase that doing risky research in BSL-2 [Biosafety Level 2 lab] was unsafe; that it was equivalent to working in a dentist’s office.

The research we conducted in China at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) followed the same biosafety rules that are established for the US. And those rules are the same now as they were then until someone changes them. So, for bat origin coronavirus, BSL-2 has been established as the appropriate safety level to do the research. For chimeras with bat-origin coronaviruses, again, you used BSL-2. That was what WIV did. We published which biosafety levels were used. They were reviewed by the biosafety committee and by scientists in the West. We supplied all the evidence to NIH, and they gave their approval. The whole process was open, transparent,and appropriate. 

People who now have criticized it, at the time when it happened, were okay with it. Of course, in retrospect, everybody has a new view of things. But those are the rules. Change the rules, and people will change the safety level. 

BM: Maybe for clarification, had you been working with SARS-CoV-1 or MERS, that would be a very different situation because these are pathogens known to cause disease in humans. Bat coronaviruses don’t pose a risk to humans, is that correct?

PD: Yes—and let me add that BSL-2 labs, where much of this work was conducted, are standard environments where researchers wear masks and gloves and take precautions to avoid contamination. Cell cultures, for example, which are easily ruined by exposure to bacteria, are worked on in BSL-2 to keep them sterile. Most people don’t realize that even the rabies virus—deadly to humans—is routinely cultured at BSL-2 in the US, because we have effective vaccines and know how to handle it safely.

To your point, bat coronaviruses are not human pathogens. A human pathogen is defined as something known to infect and cause illness in people. Bat coronaviruses studied in our research do not meet that definition—they are not known to infect humans or cause disease.

Some now argue that, because we’ve seen two major coronavirus outbreaks, all bat coronavirus research should be conducted under BSL-3. If the regulations change, we will comply—just as we’ve always followed the rules. We acted legally and ethically, and that’s why our work stands. We’re still here, and the science remains sound.

BM: Can you speak to the misuse of the term “gain-of-function,” including how it has been applied to the experiment with mice that has been cited on numerous occasions in the media and at the hearings?

PD: Our work has suffered from the misuse and misunderstanding of the term “gain-of-function.” The experiment in question—conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, funded by EcoHealth, and done in collaboration with us—has been repeatedly mischaracterized.

In one instance, a chimeric bat coronavirus was used to infect humanized mice. There was a brief, transient increase in viral genome copies per gram—a measure that includes both live and dead viruses. However, by the end of the experiment, a few days later, there was no significant difference in viral load among the infected mice using other bat coronaviruses or, in other words, a null study.

That temporary spike does not indicate the virus gained function. And even if there had been a more pronounced effect, these were bat coronaviruses—not known human pathogens—so the experiment still would not meet the NIH’s definition of gain-of-function research.

Unfortunately, repeated misreporting in the media leads the public to believe otherwise. That’s what makes me cynical. These stories are politically charged, backed by funding and agendas, and science—and scientists—become the collateral damage. But in the end, it’s the public that pays the price.

In the end, the reality of COVID’s origin is less dramatic than the conspiracy theories, but far more urgent: All over the world, people are butchering and consuming wildlife while ecosystems are being destroyed. This increased human-wildlife contact is what drives spillover events. That’s where this pandemic came from—and where the next one will likely come from too.

BM: Dr. Shi Zhengli had said that it is crucial to work with live viruses if we are really going to understand how these pathogens are going to emerge.

PD: She’s right. That’s why we collaborated with Ralph Baric, who developed a cutting-edge method for studying the spike protein. His approach involves inserting the spike from one virus into another bat coronavirus to test whether it can infect human cells. If you truly want to understand pandemic risk, you must study it directly. That means going into the field, collecting samples, bringing those viruses into the lab, and characterizing them. Without that groundwork, we’re just guessing.

Now I see papers proposing AI to predict spillover risk—which is promising. We’ve been using similar predictive machine learning models for years. But models only go so far. When you isolate a bat virus that can infect human cells—or humanized mice—you have real evidence of risk. That tells us the species carrying it is a potential source of zoonotic transmission.

From there, you can start building policy. But to persuade policymakers, you need more than a model. You need data. You need fieldwork. AI can support the process, but it can’t replace science on the ground.

BM: On May 15, 2024—just two weeks after your testimony—federal officials delivered a severe blow by suspending all funding to EcoHealth Alliance. Among their claims was that the 2019 progress report had been filed over two years late. The NIH went so far as to say there was no evidence supporting your assertion that the report couldn’t be filed due to being locked out of their grant system. In addition, both Democratic and Republican members of the committee accused your organization of grant mismanagement and of making misleading statements to federal officials.

Virologist Stuart Neil of King’s College London, speaking to Science, noted that the alleged offenses were neither criminal nor evidence of financial misconduct. He called HHS’s actions “performative political nonsense carried through by the cowardice of the ranking Democrat members on the select committee.”

Could you address how these claims were used to damage your public reputation and undermine your work?

PD: At the time we tried to file the 2019 end-of-grant progress report, we had over 50 staff members at our headquarters and were managing dozens of grants. Reports were due almost weekly, and we had a strong team dedicated to this work. We took deadlines seriously and rarely missed them—our compliance track record is excellent compared to similar organizations. So, when we missed a deadline, it was incredibly frustrating.

As detailed in our rebuttal (see page 9 to 44), we were in constant communication—me, Hongying Lee (our point of contact with the China team on the ground) and Aleksei Chmura, our Chief of Staff—trying to compile the data from our Chinese collaborators. Aleksei was responsible for submitting these reports, and we worked tirelessly to get everything aligned.

In the end, while the report was complete and ready well in advance of the deadline, we were unable to upload it into the NIH system. We were rolling into a new grant period, and there was confusion about what exactly needed to be submitted and when. This is thoroughly documented in our response, including email threads and phone calls with NIH staff. We had the data, the report was written, and we were actively trying to submit it.

Typically, if a PI [Principal Investigator] misses a report deadline, NIH follows up with a reminder to submit or risk losing funding. That never happened in our case. NIH had changed its reporting requirements between the start and end of our grant. Under the old rules, no final report was required; the preliminary data in the renewal application sufficed. That’s what we assumed—especially since the renewal was approved and funding was granted without condition or notification about a missing final report.

In the report, we provide direct quotes from multiple NIH officials under testimony to the SSCP, stating that they didn’t consider a missing final year report to be important, that the system was unable to provide the normal reminders because in April 2020 Trump had the grant terminated, and then it was placed in limbo. It seems that both NIH staff and EcoHealth Alliance staff were caught in a bureaucratic no-man’s land.

It was only much later, after our grant was terminated amid political controversy, that the late report became an issue. We appealed, sent letters through legal counsel, and repeatedly explained the situation. In retrospect, it seems NIH and the SSCP were searching for a procedural misstep to justify punitive action.

Yes, we missed the final report submission. But should that lead to debarment from all federal funding? That’s unprecedented in NIH history. Our response cites multiple cases where organizations failed to file final reports—sometimes repeatedly—without facing defunding or debarment, or any oversight actions. In fact, NIH has a long history of delayed or missing final reports. For example, approximately 60 percent of final-year reports from the National Cancer Institute were not submitted on time, according to the OIG.

So, we urge you to read our full response. It’s long and technical, but it lays out the facts clearly. If there’s to be a fair investigation into whether the EcoHealth Alliance or I acted improperly, that evidence must be considered in context. Since no one else seemed interested in doing that, we did it ourselves—and made it public, with all of the documents to back it up.

BM: I’ve read the report, and one thing stood out: There is clear documentation of ongoing communication between you, Aleksei Chmura and the NIH. Numerous emails detail the timeline, specific questions and requests—including issues accessing the NIH system, but then it seemed that the new grant process made that superfluous. The record shows consistent effort and transparency on EcoHealth’s part to comply with NIH’s regulatory requirements, in other words, “no mismanagement or misleading” NIH.

PD: Yes, that’s right. Looking back, I think my mistake when speaking to the committee was using the phrase “locked out.” NIH seized on that wording—specifically Michael Lauer, the Deputy Director for Extramural Research—who, in my view, has been just as aggressive as the SSCP in targeting scientists. He claimed there was no evidence we were “locked out” of the system. In hindsight, I should have said what you just did, that we were unable to access their system properly due to a glitch related to the status of our new grant proposal, which prevented us from uploading the report.

Lauer claimed to have conducted a forensic analysis, and we addressed that in our rebuttal. But the bottom line is: We tried to file the report. It was prepared and ready. We repeatedly asked when and how it should be submitted. At no point did NIH tell us it hadn’t been received or that we were in breach. In fact, they approved our next round of funding. It wasn’t until two and a half years later—when it became politically useful—that they reinterpreted the situation to suggest something far more serious had occurred.

BM: I found it amazing that none of the major media—the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN and the others—bothered to read the source documents, or if they did, they certainly didn’t comment on it. 

PD: I’ve been deeply disappointed by the mainstream—and particularly the left-leaning—press. Their retreat into “both-side-ism” became clear once they themselves came under attack. Rather than standing firm on evidence, outlets like the New York Times began presenting the lab leak theory as just one side of a scientific debate, claiming “some scientists say this, others say that.” But that framing is misleading, tragically so.

The so-called “other scientists” they quoted were often loud but unqualified voices—people with no background in virology, no experience working on coronaviruses, no fieldwork in wildlife markets and no expertise with bats. Many didn’t even work on viruses at all. Yet these were the sources being platformed as legitimate counterpoints.

That’s not balanced journalism. It’s giving a politically motivated and scientifically unqualified minority a megaphone. And in doing so, the press has actively undermined the public’s understanding of the truth.

BM: Perhaps one genuinely positive development to come out of all this is the recent documentary Blame, by Academy Award–nominated Swiss director Christian Frei. The film offers a thoughtful, sober account of the COVID-19 pandemic and places you, Shi Zhengli and Linfa Wang at the center of the scientific story. I found it compelling because it gives essential context to the work the three of you did, highlighting the complexity and integrity of the science—without indulging in any “both-side-ism.” It gives no ground to the lab leak hypothesis, and that alone sets it apart from much of the media coverage we’ve seen.

PD: What I appreciated most about Christian Frei’s approach was that he wasn’t interested in rehashing debates about the origins of the virus. Instead, he focused on what he called the “screaming narratives”—the social media echo chambers, the aggressive pile-ons, and the often racist or sexist attacks that have driven a wedge between scientific truth and public belief. His film confronts how we’ve moved from trusting scientific consensus to following influencers pushing supplements, books or conspiracy theories. I admired that he deliberately avoided the false balance of “both-side-ism”—and he succeeded.

That said, I was cautious about getting involved. We’d been approached by numerous documentary teams, and after a few unpleasant experiences, we learned the pattern: They would all send very similar emails—“We want to tell your side of the story, give you a chance to set the record straight”—but it was never about that. In the final product, they’d cast you as a representative of one side and then line up critics on the other. They controlled the narrative and gave too much oxygen to a vocal, conspiratorial minority. So, we stopped participating in those projects.

Then we received an email from Christian Frei in Switzerland—and it was different. He wasn’t pitching a narrative war. He expressed genuine interest in our work on bats and viruses. He described a project titled The Host, focused on why bats—these mysterious animals that live in dense colonies—harbor viruses, and the research we’ve done to understand that.

His message was thoughtful and informed. He included beautiful concept art and a detailed pitch that showed he had really done the background research. We agreed to speak with him. I found him compelling—gentle, insightful and deeply knowledgeable. He has a unique perspective, which comes through in all his work—whether on genetic engineering, social media or space tourism.

To me, Blame is the most honest and definitive film about the origins of COVID-19. It doesn’t sensationalize. It seeks understanding.

BM: As we conclude, maybe you could discuss your new project, Nature.Health.Global.

PD: The past five years have been incredibly difficult—for EcoHealth Alliance, for me personally, for my family and for our colleagues. When Congress proposed debarment of our organization, we knew we were in serious trouble. Grants were terminated—some immediately, others gradually—and it eventually seemed inevitable that EcoHealth would have to close. I fought to keep it alive. We could have continued, and I believed in that fight. But ultimately, the board voted to shut it down.

Still, a small group of us—staff, colleagues and collaborators—asked ourselves: In a time when pandemics are becoming more frequent, is closing an organization dedicated to preventing them really the right decision? Absolutely not.

So, we chose to carry on. To keep the mission alive. To take it to the next level and focus even more sharply on true pandemic prevention. We know why pandemics emerge. We know where they’re most likely to originate. And that knowledge is too important to abandon.

EcoHealth spent 25 years leading the way in pandemic prevention science. We don’t want to walk away from that legacy. That’s why we’ve founded a new organization: Nature.Health.Global. It hasn’t been easy. We’ve incorporated, we’re operational, and we’re fundraising every day. But we’re committed to pushing forward—to doing the science, conducting the research, and resisting the narratives that seek to undermine evidence-based work. We’re continuing the core mission: addressing the links between deforestation and health, climate change and disease, land use, wildlife trade, and even ocean health—an often-overlooked piece of the puzzle when it comes to emerging diseases.

And we’re adding something new—a commitment to defending science and scientists from disinformation and politicization. We believe science plays a vital role in society, and we’re determined to protect that role—and live up to it.

BM: Any final thoughts? Perhaps you could also share how Dr. Shi Zhengli is doing. She’s rarely mentioned in these discussions, but it’s clear the past five years—and the intense right-wing backlash—must have taken a personal and professional toll.

PD: I think everyone involved has been deeply affected. There’s a film called Girl, Interrupted about a young woman navigating a psychiatric institution—but what we’ve seen over the past five years feels like Science, Interrupted.

On April 17, 2020, President Trump abruptly announced the termination of our NIH grant. From that moment, our work was disrupted. International collaboration stalled, communication with colleagues in China—especially with Shi Zhengli—became extremely difficult, and critical research has been frozen. We have unpublished data from those grants that may never see the light of day because our collaborators’ governments are afraid—afraid of political consequences, of association, of speaking out.

Shi Zhengli’s work, like Linfa Wang’s and mine, has suffered greatly. I don’t believe she’s been able to leave China or attend international meetings freely. Despite China recognizing these attacks as politically motivated, publishing has become harder. Her research is unfairly criticized. Her global voice has been diminished—and that’s a loss for all of us.

I haven’t seen her in-person since early 2021 in Wuhan, and I sometimes wonder if I ever will again. It’s surreal that the very scientists—Shi, Linfa and I—who warned for decades about the risks of another coronavirus pandemic, are now silenced, separated and unable to do the work we were trained to do.

It feels like a medieval response to a modern crisis. I had hoped we were better than this.

BM: Dr. Daszak, thank you for your candid replies and all your time.

PD: It’s my pleasure, and thank you for your reporting throughout the pandemic and speaking up for the people who’ve borne much of the brunt of the impact of often badly thought-out politically-motivated decisions.